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Nowadays, there is a significant experimental evidence of excellent ex-post predictive accuracy in certain types of
prediction markets, such as markets for elections. This evidence shows that prediction markets are efficient mechanisms
for aggregating information and are more accurate in forecasting events than traditional forecasting methods, such as
polls. Interpretation of prediction market prices as probabilities has been extensively studied in the literature, however
little attention so far has been given to understanding volatility of prediction market prices. In this paper, we present a
model of a prediction market with a binary payoff on a competitive event involving two parties. In our model, each party
has some underlying “ability” process that describes its ability to win and evolves as an Ito diffusion. We show that if
the prediction market for this event is efficient and accurate, the price of the corresponding contract will also follow a
diffusion and its instantaneous volatility is a particular function of the current claim price and its time to expiration. We
generalize our results to competitive events involving more than two parties and show that volatilities of prediction market
contracts for such events are again functions of the current claim prices and the time to expiration, as well as of several
additional parameters (ternary correlations of the underlying Brownian motions). In the experimental section, we validate
our model on a set of InTrade prediction markets and show that it is consistent with observed volatilities of contract returns
and outperforms the well-known GARCH model in predicting future contract volatility from historical price data. To
demonstrate the practical value of our model, we apply it to pricing options on prediction market contracts, such as those
recently introduced by InTrade. Other potential applications of this model include detection of significant market moves
and improving forecast standard errors.
Key words: prediction market; stochastic model applications; volatility
1. Introduction
Nowadays, there is a significant evidence of excellent efficiency and ex-post predictive accuracy in cer-
tain types of prediction markets, such as markets for presidential elections (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004a).
Berg et al. (2003) show that Iowa Electronic Markets significantly outperform polls in predicting the results
of national elections. Moreover, they found “no obvious biases in the market forecasts and, on average, con-
siderable accuracy, especially for large, U.S. election markets”. Leigh and Wolfers (2006) provide statistical
evidence that Australian betting markets for 2004 Australian elections were at least weakly efficient1 and
1 future stock price cannot be predicted from historical prices
1
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responded very quickly to major campaign news. Luckner et al. (2008) report that prediction markets for
the FIFA World Cup outperform predictions based on the FIFA world ranking. According to official press
releases, Hollywood Stock Exchange prediction market consistently shows 80% accuracy for predicting
Oscar nominations (HSX 2008).
One should also acknowledge that prediction markets are not perfect information aggregation
mechanisms and may suffer from certain types of behavioral biases, such as the “favorite-longshot
bias” (Thaler and Ziemba 1988). Reports on behavioral biases and other inefficiencies in prediction markets
are not uniform even for different types of prediction markets on a single exchange. For example, Tetlock
(2004) found that sports wagering markets on TradeSports.com overreact to news and exhibit “reverse
favorite-longshot bias”, however the same inefficiencies are not observed in financial markets on the same
exchange even though both types of markets have similar structure, liquidity and trading volume. Amazingly,
prediction markets with high liquidity can sometimes be less efficient than low-liquidity prediction markets
and the “forecasting resolution of market prices actually worsens with increases in liquidity” (Tetlock 2008).
Notwithstanding the biases mentioned above, the success of public prediction markets as information
aggregation mechanisms led to internal corporate applications of prediction markets for forecasting purposes
and as decision support systems (Berg and Rietz 2003). Chen and Plott (2002) show that prediction markets
on sales forecasting inside Hewlett-Packard Corporation performed significantly better than traditional
corporate forecasting methods in most of the cases. In another example, Google has launched internal
prediction markets in April 2005. Cowgill et al. (2008) report that Google’s experiment with prediction
markets revealed a number of biases such as optimism and overpricing of favorites, however “as market
participants gained experience over the course of our sample period, the biases become less pronounced”.
It is even hypothesized that prediction markets can be used for analysis and evaluation of governmental
policies (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004b).
Despite significant experimental evidence that prediction market prices are good estimates of actual
probabilities of the events happening, some researchers have argued that there is little existing theory
supporting this practice (Manski 2006). Several papers published in the last few years attempted to provide
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such theoretical background. For example, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) describe sufficient conditions under
which prediction market prices correspond to mean population beliefs.2 They also show that, for a broad
class of models, prediction market prices must be close to the mean beliefs of traders, even when these
conditions are invalid.
We can see that interpretation of prediction market prices as probabilities has been extensively studied
in the literature. Nevertheless, little attention so far has been paid to understanding volatility of prediction
market prices, a surprising fact, given that volatility is one of the most crucial concepts in the analysis of
markets. Volatility has intrinsic interest to prediction market researchers, not only as a measure of market
dynamics, but also for its numerous practical applications. Even a simple task of distinguishing ‘normal’
market moves from major events can significantly benefit from having a volatility model.
So, our research question emerges naturally: “If the price of a claim3 in a prediction market is expectation
of the actual probability of the event happening, what can we say about volatility of the claim?” To answer
this question we need a model of evolution of the underlying event. Consider a contingent claim that pays
$1 at time T , if and only if some event A happens. A simple model may say that whether the event will
happen is predetermined at time t < T and this information is known to informed traders. A model like
that was used to study information dissemination in financial markets and informational role of prices in
disclosing information held by insiders. In a seminal paper, Kyle (1985) considers a model of a betting
market with three kinds of traders: one risk-neutral informed trader (insider) that knows the real value of the
bet, a mass of random noise traders, and a competitive risk-neutral market maker. Kyle shows that, in this
model, there is a unique linear equilibrium in which price follows a Brownian motion and variance of the
market uncertainty about value of the bet decreases linearly until the end of the trading, when all insider’s
information is revealed to the market. Back et al. (2000) extended the analysis to the market with several
informed traders having different but potentially correlated signals. Both papers, however, present striking
examples of market inefficiency: the information is revealed gradually and full revelation happens only at T .
2 A sufficient but not necessary condition for this is for beliefs and wealth to be uncorrelated.
3 In this paper we adopt a popular financial convention of referring to a prediction market contract as a contingent claim or just a
claim.
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If in these models we enforce the efficiency assumption (i.e., that available information is disseminated to the
market instantly), then the price of a contingent claim will not fluctuate even in the presence of noisy traders.
So, why would the price of a claim fluctuate in an efficient prediction market? Departing from the
framework of Kyle (1985) that relies on presence of informational asymmetries to explain price fluctuations,
we propose the explanation that fluctuation happens because the event A is not predetermined at time t < T ,
even if all information available at time t is revealed to all market players. To model this uncertainty, we
introduce the notion of “abilities” for the event participants. These abilities are not constant, but are evolving
over time, and so we model them as latent4 stochastic processes. At expiration, the state of the “ability”
processes defines what is the outcome of the event: the party with the highest “ability” wins. Since the “ability”
processes evolve stochastically over time, the current state of the claim reveals only partial information about
the future, and the larger the time to expiration, the less certain we are about the final state of the process.
For our modeling purposes, we will further assume that abilities evolve as Ito diffusions, a particular type of
stochastic process that is convenient to work with, as we can apply well-developed tools from stochastic
calculus. Adopting a diffusion-like approach makes our model bear certain similarity to a recently published
result showing that a simple diffusion model provides a good fit of the evolution of the winning probability
in the 2004 Presidential elections market at InTrade.com (Chen et al. 2008). However, Chen et al. (2008)
consider only a very restrictive parametric specification5 and do not analyze the volatility of prices.
As the main theoretical contribution of this paper, we show that the parameters of the underlying stochastic
processes affect the claim price but do not affect its volatility. In fact, one of the simplest, yet most amazing
formulas in the paper shows that if we adopt the diffusion model and the underlying “ability” processes are
homoscedastic, the instantaneous volatility of the claim, for an event involving two parties, is fully defined
by its current price and the time to expiration.6 The results generalize to events with more than two parties,
however the volatility expression becomes more complex, has no closed form (to the best of our knowledge)
and depends on additional parameters of “ability processes” such as ternary correlations.
4 Latent to researchers however observed by traders.
5 No drift, constant volatility
6 If the underlying “ability” processes are heteroscedastic, in practice, one can combine our model with any conditional heteroscedas-
ticity model (say, GARCH) as we show in Section 4.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of the volatility concept
and positions our approach within the stream of research on volatility modeling. Section 3 presents our
main theoretical results for pricing of bets in “ideal” prediction markets where the underlying event can
be described by a pair of diffusion process. An extension of the theoretical framework to events involving
more than two competing parties is quite technical and is presented in Appendix A. Section 4 presents our
experimental results obtained for a collection of InTrade prediction markets that show that the volatility
pattern derived from our diffusion model is consistent with empirically observed return volatilities. Section 5
discusses the experimental results and outlines research questions and directions for further research on
this topic. Section 6 presents an application of our model to pricing options on prediction market claims.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper with a short summary of the theoretical and empirical results and their
managerial implications.
2. Volatility in Financial Markets
What is volatility? Wikipedia7 defines volatility as “the standard deviation of the continuously compounded
returns of a financial instrument with a specific time horizon.” Volatility is a natural measure of risk in
financial markets as it describes the level of uncertainty about future asset returns. Empirical studies of
volatility can be traced as far as Mandelbrot (1963) who observed that large absolute changes in the price of
an asset are often followed by other large absolute changes (not necessarily of the same sign), and small
absolute changes are often followed by small absolute changes. This famous fact is usually referred to
as “volatility clustering” or “volatility persistence” and is nowadays a “must have” requirement for any
volatility model in the financial literature. It is was not until two decades later that the first successful model
of volatility forecasting was developed by Engle (1982). The insight of Engle’s ARCH8 model was that, in
order to capture “volatility clustering”, one should model volatility conditional on previous returns: if the
square of the previous return is large one would expect the square of the current return to be large as well.
That gave rise to the famous pair of equations:
rt = htεt
7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volatility_(finance)
8 AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
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h2t = α+βr
2
t−1
where rt represent return, ht volatility and εt are i.i.d. residuals. Engle’s model was later generalized
by Bollerslev (1986) as GARCH9 to allow for lagged volatility in the volatility equation and the topic
exploded by producing a multitude of different volatility models in the next two decades (Bera and Higgins
1993). The research on volatility modeling was primarily guided by the observed properties of the empirical
distribution of returns in financial markets, so understanding these properties helps understanding the
taxonomy and evolution of volatility models (Engle and Patton 2001). According to Engle and Patton (2001)
a good volatility model must be able to generate return distribution possessing the following properties:
1. Volatility clustering: large absolute returns must be followed by large absolute returns.
2. Mean reversion: long run volatility forecast must be equal to its unconditional volatility i.e., volatility
“comes and goes.”
3. Asymmetry (or leverage) effect: negative shocks generally have higher impact on volatility than
positive shocks.10
4. Heavy tails: financial returns generally have much heavier tails than the normal distribution.
One can now see why it is probably not a good idea to just take an “off-the-shelf” volatility model from
financial literature and apply it to prediction markets:
1. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence that prediction market returns show signif-
icant “volatility clustering.” In the experimental part of this paper, we study a collection of InTrade contracts
and indeed provide evidence that volatility of daily returns has some persistency, however experimental
results show that our model outperforms GARCH in volatility forecasting for InTrade contracts.
2. We have strong reasons to suggest that prediction market volatilities are not mean-reverting. The
rationale for this follows from our theoretical model: prediction market volatility is not stationary as it
explicitly depends on the remaining time until contract expiration.
9 Generalized AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
10 The effect is usually present in stock markets but might be absent in some types of financial markets where there are no absolutely
“negative/positive” news, for example, currency markets.
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3. Asymmetry is not meaningful within the context of prediction markets as well. Consider, for example,
a Presidential elections contract on win of the Republican nominee vs. similar contract on win of the
Democratic nominee. An asymmetric model will suggest that if the price of the first contract drops, its
volatility must go up more than if it rises by the same amount. Same logic can be applied to the second
contract and we obtain a contradiction by noting that gain of the first contract is loss of the second contract
and, as prices of both contracts sum to a constant, both of them must have the same volatility.
The major property of the empirical distribution of financial returns that we can also see replicated in the
prediction market returns is the presence of “heavy tails”. We will discuss this property and its modeling
applications more in the Section 5 of this paper.
One may now ask that if “off-the-shelf” volatility models are not likely to work for prediction markets,
whether there are some results from financial literature that we can borrow? The answer is “yes”, if we adopt
a model of latent “ability” processes, we can use modeling techniques employed for option pricing.11 Indeed,
assuming the existence of a latent “ability” process evolving as an Ito diffusion, a prediction market contract
can be priced in the same way as a binary option on a stock whose risk-neutral price evolution is the same as
the evolution of our latent “ability” process.
The next section develops this idea by presenting the binary scenario which is the simplest to solve and
generates the most elegant results.
3. Volatility Model for Prediction Markets on Events With Two Competing Parties
A diffusion model can be most naturally introduced for bets on competitive events such as presidential
elections or the Super Bowl finals. Consider a prediction market for a simple event in which two parties
(McCain vs. Obama or Patriots vs. Giants) compete with each other. Assume that each party has some strength
value like potential to win. Denote strength of the first party as S1, and strength of the second party as S2. We
consider S1 and S2 to be stochastic processes and refer to them as ability processes. What is the price of a
contingent claim sold at time t that will pay $1 if the first party wins at the final moment of time T ? Assuming
11 Be careful, however, that we borrow the “tricks” from risk-neutral pricing but not the arguments in defense of risk-neutral pricing
such as Delta hedging. Those do not work for prediction markets as discussed in the Section 5.
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that the prediction market is efficient and unbiased it must be that pi(t) =E [Pw(S1(T ), S2(T )) |Ft ], where
Pw is the instantaneous winning probability of the first party as a function of both party’s abilities, andFt
represents the information set at time t.1213 Note that in our “ideal” market all market players have the same
information set (Ft) which includes all information on evolution of the ability processes until the current
moment of time.
In order to complete the model we need to make two additional assumptions:
1. We should describe stochastic processes S1 and S2 driving the underlying abilities of each team.
2. We should describe instantaneous winning probability Pw of the first party as a function of both party’s
abilities.
We model S1 and S2 as Ito processes:
dS1 = a1(S1, t)dt+ b1(S1, t)dW1
dS2 = a2(S2, t)dt+ b2(S2, t)dW2
(1)
where a1(s, t), a2(s, t) are drifts and b1(s, t), b2(s, t) are volatilities, potentially different for each pro-
cess S1, S2. The processes are driven by two standard Brownian motions Wi that can be correlated with
corr(W1,W2) = ρ12 (|ρ12|< 1). As for Pw, we can either assume that the strongest party always wins or
allow for additional randomness by including smoothing using either logit or probit function. In the following,
for simplicity, we will assume no smoothing and use Pw(S1, S2) = I+ (S1−S2), where I+ is the indicator
function for positive numbers, i.e. the strongest party wins14. We discuss first a relatively simple case, where
the drifts and volatilities of the “ability” processes remain constant over time.
3.1. Constant coefficients
Consider a constant coefficients model: ai(Si, t)≡ µi, bi(Si, t)≡ σi. In other words, S1 and S2 are assumed
to be Brownian motions with drifts:
dS1 = µ1dt+σ1dW1
dS2 = µ2dt+σ2dW2
12 Formally, it is a σ-algebra generated by (S1(s), S2(s)), 0≤ s≤ t.
13 In this paper we take risk-free rate to be zero though theoretical results can be easily extended to any constant risk-free rate. A zero
rate approximation is sufficient for all practical purposes considering the speculative nature of prediction market contracts.
14 Who wins in case of equal abilities is not important as this is a zero-probability event.
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Note that the difference process (S = S1−S2) can be written as
dS = µdt+σdW,
where µ= µ1−µ2, σ=
√
σ21 +σ22 − 2ρ12σ1σ2 and W = 1σ (σ1W1−σ2W2) is a standard Brownian motion.
Now, by Markovity of our stochastic processes, the price pi(t) of a prediction market bid can be written
simply as:
pi(t) = P{S(T )> 0|S(t)},
We can further expand pi(t) as:
pi(t) = P
{
W (T )−W (t)>−S(t) +µ(T − t)
σ
}
(2)
As W is a Brownian motion, W (T )−W (t) is a normal random variable with mean zero and volatility
σ
√
T − t, so:
pi(t) =N
(
S(t) +µ(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
)
, (3)
whereN is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.
While this is a closed-form result, it depends on the unobserved value S(t)15 and therefore is not directly
useful. We can obtain deeper insight by analyzing the evolution of the price process. By applying Ito’s
formula (Oksendal 2005) to pi(t), we get:
dpi(t) =
∂pi
∂t
dt+
∂pi
∂S
dS+
1
2
∂2pi
∂S2
(dS)2. (4)
Now, from Equation 3
∂pi
∂t
=
1
2σ
(√
T − t)3φ
(
S(t) +µ(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
)
(S(t)−µ(T − t))
=
1
2σ(T − t)φ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)(
N −1 (pi(t))− 2µ√T − t
)
,
∂pi
∂S
=
1
σ
√
T − tφ
(
S(t) +µ(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
)
=
1
σ
√
T − tφ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)
,
15 Our derivation is based on the assumption that σ(S(t))⊂Ft i.e. abilities of each party are public information at time t. Thought
it is reasonable to assume that this information is well-known to market players, it might not be available to researchers estimating
the model (or might be perceived as subjective).
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∂2pi
∂S2
= − 1
(σ
√
T − t)3φ
(
S(t) +µ(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
)
(S(t) +µ(T − t))
= − 1
σ3(T − t)φ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)
N −1 (pi(t)) ,
where φ stands for probability density function of the standard normal distribution. We can substitute these
expressions to the diffusion Equation 4 together with dS = µdt+σdW and (dS)2 = σ2dt. The terms for the
drift cancel16 and we get an equation:
dpi(t) = 0 dt+
1√
T − tφ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)
dW.
We can see that instantaneous volatility of pi(t) (call it Σ(t)) is given by the expression:
Σ(t) =
1√
T − tφ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)
, (5)
which depends only on the current price pi(t) and the time to expiration T − t and does not depend on any
parameters of the underlying latent stochastic processes.
3.2. General Case For Binary Claims
The result we obtained in the previous example for the constant coefficient case can be generalized with
some restrictions on parameters of the underlying diffusions as stated by the next Theorem. In particular, we
relax the assumption that drifts or volatilities of “ability” processes are constant, though we need to assume
that the coefficients are non-stochastic and that, if the dependency on the current process state is present, it is
linear. Note that this theorem covers both the case of a standard Brownian Motion with drift as well as the
case of a log-normal Brownian Motion with drift as the latter can be written as dS = µSdt+σSdW . It also
implicitly covers the case of a “barrier” bet that pays one dollar if S1(T )>K where K is a fixed constant -
just take µ2 ≡ σ2 ≡ 0.
THEOREM 1. (Contingent claim pricing in a simple prediction market with two competing par-
ties) Consider a complete probability space (Ω,F , P ) on which we have a two-dimensional Brow-
nian motion (W1(t), W2(t); Ft); 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where Ft is a natural filtration for W1,2 i.e. Ft =
16 As they should because of the law of iterated expectations.
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σ ((W1(s), W2(s)); 0≤ s≤ t). Assume that each (Wi(t); Ft) is a standard Brownian motion and
corr(W1(t), W2(t)) = ρ12, |ρ12| < 1. Consider a prediction market for a competitive event such that
underlying ability processes S1 and S2 areFt-measurable and satisfy the diffusion equation:
dSi = µi(t)(αSi +β)dt+σi(t)(αSi +β)dWi,
where µi(t) is a continuous function, σi(t) is a continuous non-negative function, α ≥ 0 and
P {αSi +β > 0}= 1. Define the contingent claim price process pi(t) as
pi(t) =E [I (S1(T )>S2(T )) |Ft ] .
Under conditions above, pi(t) is an Ito’s diffusion with zero drift and instantaneous volatility given by the
following expression:
Σ(t) =
√
σ21(t) +σ22(t)− 2ρ12σ1(t)σ2(t)√∫ T
t
(σ21(u) +σ22(u)− 2ρ12σ1(u)σ2(u))du
φ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)
.
In other words, dpi(t) = Σ(t)dW where W is some standard Brownian motion with respect to filtrationFt.
Proof: See Appendix B.
COROLLARY 1. In case of constant volatility of the underlying ability processes(σi(t)≡ σi), the volatility
of the contingent claim is just
Σ(t) =
1√
T − tφ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)
The Theorem 1 extends our previous result that given the current price of the contingent claim and its time
to expiration we can determine its instantaneous volatility without knowing any parameters of the underlying
ability processes such as their drifts or volatilities unless there are “seasonal” effects in the volatility of the
“ability” processes in which case our constant coefficient estimate (Equation 5) needs to be scaled by the ratio
of the current volatility of the “ability” processes to the future average volatility of the “ability” processes
until the expiration. For example, if the current claim price is 0.5, the time to expiration is 10 time units and
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Figure 1 Claim Volatility As Function of Its Current Price and Time (claim expires at T = 1, current time t= 0)
we assume no “seasonal” effects, then its instantaneous volatility (with respect to the same time units) should
be 1√
10
1√
2pi
≈ 0.126.
Note that our formula predicts that:
1. Having the claim price fixed, volatility of the claim is proportional to inverse square root of the time
until expiration.
2. Having the time to expiration fixed, volatility of the claim is a strictly decreasing function of the
distance between the claim price and 0.5 and it goes to zero as the claim price approaches 0.0 or 1.0.
The dependency of the claim volatility on the claim price and the time to expiration is shown in Figure 1.
One, however, might be more interested in the behavior of claim volatility if we don’t force its price to be
constant but let the claim evolve “naturally”. Two interesting questions that might be asked based on our
model are:
1. What is the expected instantaneous claim volatility at some future moment of time r?
2. What is the expected average volatility of the claim from the current moment of time until the future
moment of time r?
The first of these questions is answered by Theorem 2 which says that our best forecast of the instantaneous
volatility in the future is the current claim volatility weighted by “seasonal” effects if necessary.
THEOREM 2. (Instantaneous volatility is a martingale) In the setting of the Theorem 1, Σ(t)
σ(t)
is a martingale
i.e.,
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∀ r ∈ [t, T ] E
[
Σ(r)
σ(r)
|Ft
]
=
Σ(t)
σ(t)
.
In particular, if we assume that σi(t)≡ σi, then Σ(t) is a martingale.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The second question is answered by the Theorem 3.
THEOREM 3. (Average expected claim volatility) In the setting of the Theorem 1, take r ∈ (t, T ) and
define
Λ =
∫ r
t
σ2(u)du∫ T
t
σ2(u)du
i.e., Λ is the volatility-weighted ratio of the time elapsed to the total contract duration (in particular, if we
assume that σi(t)≡ σi, then Λ = r−tT−t ). Then,
E
[
(pi(r)−pi(t))2 |Ft
]
=
∫ Λ
0
1√
1−λ2φ
2
(
1√
1 +λ
N −1 (pi(t))
)
dλ (6)
Proof: See Appendix B.
COROLLARY 2. (“Ex-post expected” price trajectory) In the setting of Theorem 3,
E [pi(r) |Ft, pi(T ) ] = pi(t) + 1
pi(t)
∫ Λ
0
1√
1−λ2φ
2
(
1√
1 +λ
N −1 (pi(t))
)
dλ.
Proof: Direct application of the Theorem 1 from Pennock et al. (2002), which says that, if the market price
in a prediction market is an unbiased estimate of the probability of the actual event E, then
E [pi(t) |pi(t− 1), E ] = pi(t− 1) + Var{pi(t)|pi(t− 1)}
pi(t− 1) .
Q.E.D.
The corollary 2 deserves some clarification. Our model was built under assumption that the claim price is
a martingale i.e. E [pi(r) |Ft ] = pi(t). It follows that an “average” of all price trajectories of a claim from
point (t, pi(t)) is just a horizontal line. Imagine now that an observer (but not a trader) has access to an oracle
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Figure 2 Expected claim price conditional on event happening (’x’) or not (’o’) (claim expires at T = 1, current
time t= 0)
that can say whether the event will actually happen or not. Naturally, if the oracle says “yes”, it eliminates
all price trajectories converging to zero. The corollary 2 tells us what one would obtain by averaging all
remaining trajectories that converge to one. We show the expected price trajectories for several initial price
values in the Figure 2. Note that all price trajectories converge either to 1.0 (event happens) or to 0.0 (event
does not happen).
In conclusion of this section, we would like to note that our model can be extended to handle claims with
three or more competing parties. The extension is based on similar ideas, but the results and the derivations
become quite technical, so we list the details in Appendix A.
4. Experimental Evaluation
In this section we present the experimental evaluation of our model on a set of InTrade prediction market
contracts.
4.1. Data
Our data set contained daily observations for a collection of InTrade prediction market contracts. InTrade
is an online Dublin-based trading exchange web site founded in 2001 and acquired by TradeSports.com in
2003. The trading unit on InTrade is a contract with a typical settlement value of $10, which is measured on a
100 points scale. To be consistent with our convention that the winning contract pays $1, we have normalized
all price data to be in [0,1] range, so, for example, a 50 points price of InTrade contract is represented by 0.5
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Variable Min Max Mean Median Standard Deviation
Observations per contract 1 1427 375.76 237 334.52
Time to expiration 2 1933 417.68 347 306.35
Daily deviations -0.93 0.942 -1.5923e-005 0 0.018869
Returns -0.9975 449 0.019172 0 1.4059
Price 0.001 0.995 0.244 0.075 0.32092
Volume 0 9 0.46122 0 1.4053
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for 901 InTrade contracts (338,563 observations)
in our data set. The full data set we analyzed included daily closing price and volume data for a collection of
901 InTrade contracts obtained by periodic crawling of InTrade’s web site.17 Table 1 provides the descriptive
statistics for our sample. Note that we use term “price difference” or “absolute return” to represent price
changes between two consecutive days at = pt− pt−1, while just “return” refers to rt = pt−pt−1pt−1 .
A closer examination of the data reveals several interesting facts that must be taken into account in our
empirical application. At first, 288,119 of 338,563 observations that we have (i.e. > 85% of the whole data
sets) had zero price change since the previous day. Moreover, 287,430 of these observations had zero daily
trading volume, what means that most of the time price did not change because of the absence of any trading
activity. We presume that absence of activity in many of InTrade prediction markets can be attributed partially
to low liquidity of most of the markets in our sample and partially to high transaction costs for contracts
executed on the exchange.18 Even if we exclude observations with at = 0 from our data set, returns exhibit
the following “round number” bias: absolute returns divisible by 5 ticks19 occur much more frequently than
absolute returns of similar magnitude that are not divisible by 5 ticks. For example, 5 ticks price difference
has occurred 2,228 times in our data set as opposed to 624 times for 4 tick difference and 331 times for 6
tick difference. In fact, more than half of all non-zero price differences in our data set are divisible by 5 ticks.
The bias can be easily seen in Figure 3 that plots absolute return sizes against corresponding frequencies on
regular and log scales. Similar effect can be observed for prices, as shown in Figure 4.
17 InTrade keeps historical data for each contract on the web site, however expired contracts disappear from the web site after certain
amount of time. This is why periodic crawling was necessary.
18 InTrade charges a 5 points commission from each such contract.
19 One InTrade tick is equal to 0.1 InTrade point or 0.1 cent in our normalization.
Archak and Ipeirotis: Modeling Volatility in Prediction Markets
16 Working Paper CeDER-08-07, New York University
Figure 3 Number of times a deviation of a certain size has occurred (tick = 0.1 InTrade point; zero deviations
excluded)
Figure 4 Histogram of prices
4.2. Model Test
Our theoretical model predicts that, for each observation, conditional on price history:
at = htεt, (7)
ht =
√∫ Λ
0
1√
1−λ2φ
2
(
1√
1 +λ
N −1 (pt)
)
dλ (8)
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where ht is the conditional volatility of absolute returns, Λ = 1T−t
2021 and εt are independent identically
distributed standard22 random variables23. While most of InTrade contracts in our sample have more than two
possible outcomes, we believe the qualitative behavior of contract prices can be well captured by our simple
result for binary model. To test our statement we propose taking logs of the absolute value of Equation 7:24
log(|at|) =E [log |εt|] + log(ht) + log |εt| −E [log |εt|] .
Now, let γ =E [log |εt|] and µt = log |εt| −E [log |εt|]. Note that E [µt |Ft ] = 0 and
log(|at|) = γ+ log(ht) +µt,
so we’re in a regression-like setting even though the residuals are not normally distributed.
We suggest two different tests of our model, both of which require taking absolute values of price differ-
ences and regressing them on a constant and log(ht). The first test checks for presence of heteroscedasticity
effects of time and price as predicted by our theory. The null hypothesis here is that coefficient on log(ht)
is equal to zero and we want to reject it. To the contrary, the second test checks that the magnitude of
heteroscedasticity effects is consistent with our theory. The null hypothesis here is that coefficient on log(ht)
is equal to one and we do not want to reject it.
Results of this regression are given in the Table 2, standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity25.
Note that we included zero deviations (but not zero volume trading days), but to avoid taking logs of zero
we added a small smoothing factor (10−4) under the log(|at|). In Table 2 we report the results of three
regressions. The first regression included all observations, the second regression included all observations
with price in (0.05,0.95) range and the last regression included all observations with price in (0.1,0.9)
20 As we take daily returns, time must be measured in days.
21 In this section we assume that the underlying “ability” process is homoscedastic i.e. σi(t)≡ σi.
22 mean zero, variance one
23 We do not know what is the distribution of εt, however for small values of Λ it must be close to normal.
24 We take logs instead of squares of returns as logs are more robust to outliers in the data (which are plenty because of the “fat tails”
of the return distribution, as will be discussed later). Similar results can be obtained with squares of returns.
25 As one can see from the Figure 5, residuals are indeed heteroscedastic as when volatility is high so is the residual.
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Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. 95% Conf. Lower Bound 95% Conf. Upper Bound
constant -3.38 0.031 -3.4437 -3.323
log(ht) 0.630 0.005 0.6204 0.639
constant -2.46 0.086 -2.6338 -2.298
log(ht) 0.846 0.020 0.8078 0.886
constant -2.10 0.115 -2.3266 -1.876
log(ht) 0.946 0.028 0.8900 1.001
Table 2 Three pooled regressions of logs of absolute returns (R2 = 0.109, 0.027, 0.022)
range. We report results with excluded marginal observations because such observations are most seriously
affected by the bias depicted in Figure 3. Moreover, there is substantial evidence from the prior research
suggesting that people tend to overvalue small probabilities and undervalue near certainties, i.e., the so
called “favorite-longshot bias” (Thaler and Ziemba 1988). This effect may be especially strong in our sample
as it happened to be skewed towards low price contracts (see Figure 4). As we see from Table 2, the null
hypothesis for the first test is strongly rejected in all three cases, meaning that there are indeed strong
heteroscedasticity effects of the current contract price and the time until contract expiration. For the second
test, while in the first two cases the null hypothesis is rejected at 95% confidence level, the coefficient on
log(ht) improves (i.e. approaches the predicted value of 1) as we exclude the marginal observations.
At that point we may get concerned that our results might be affected by potential heterogeneity of
contracts. While the basic theory suggests that εt are i.i.d. residuals, in practice we may expect correlations in
volatility levels for the same contract, for example, due to different liquidity levels of contracts in the sample
(some contracts, like those for democratic primaries are very liquid but many others are not, and may display
lower or higher volatility because of liquidity issues). In order to alleviate these concerns we also included
contract-specific effects to our regression. In the Table 3 we report results of panel data regressions with fixed
effects for contracts. Note that the Breusch and Pagan LM test rejects absence of effects (χ2(1) = 5448.76,
Prob >χ2 = 0.0000) and the Hausman test does not reject the random effects model26 (χ2(1) = 0.97, Prob
>χ2 = 0.3258).
We also noted that because of potential auto-correlation in absolute returns we may underestimate actual
26 We still report results of the fixed effects model as the number of samples that we have makes efficiency not a concern. Results of
the random effects model are quantitatively similar.
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Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. 95% Conf. Lower Bound 95% Conf. Upper Bound
log(ht) 0.6438 0.013112 0.61810 0.66951
log(ht) 1.0370 0.039503 0.95957 1.11443
log(ht) 1.1910 0.049832 1.09341 1.28876
Table 3 Three fixed effect regressions of logs of absolute returns (within R2 = 0.0456, 0.0244, 0.0268)
standard errors; we tried a random-effects regression with AR(1) disturbances (GLS estimator). Indeed, we
found significant auto-correlation in residuals (ρ= 0.526); correcting for autocorrelation makes standard
errors slightly larger but does not affect the results significantly.
Furthermore, we have replicated all results using the instantaneous volatility from Equation 5 instead of
the average daily volatility from Equation 8. As most of the observations in our sample are relatively far
from the expiration date, instantaneous volatilities were close to daily averages and the regression results
were not significantly different.
As instantaneous volatility expression provides particularly nice separation of time and price effects,
we also suggest running a simple visual test in addition to regression based testing. As we have plenty of
observations, we can use data to estimate sample means of the log(|at|) conditional on fixed price or fixed
time to expiration. We can then plot the means against predictions of our model and see if the qualitative
behavior is similar. Results that we obtained are presented in Figure 5. Solid lines shown on the picture are
plots of log (φ(N −1(pt−1))) and −0.5 log (T − t) shifted by a constant so that they match the data means.
4.3. Predicting future volatility and comparison with GARCH model
So far, in our experimental results we were ignoring potential heteroscedasticity of the “ability” processes
and, therefore, potential heteroscedasticity of the contract prices. Our main concern is that, if “volatility
clustering” indeed has significant presence in prediction market prices, one might be able to forecast volatility
better by using historical data than by using our theoretical results. In general, one cannot prove or disprove
such a statement as different prediction markets and even different contracts can exhibit different levels of
“volatility clustering”, and so the answer can only be given on a per-contract basis. In this paper, we report
our test for a sample of 51 InTrade contracts where each contract represents the Democratic Party Nominee
winning Electoral College Votes of a particular state in 2008 Presidential Election.
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Figure 5 Sample means of log of absolute returns conditional on fixed price or time to expiration against
predictions of our model.
In our test we compared three models, the GARCH(1,1) model (Bollerslev 1986), our model assuming
homoscedasticity of the “ability” processes, and the GARCH(1,1) model applied to standardized residuals
from our model27. Note that our model is non-parametric while other two models require estimating
parameters of the GARCH process from historical data. As we are more interested in forecasting volatility
than in explaining it, we separated observations for each contract into two equal parts - the first part was
used to learn parameters of the GARCH processes (on a per contract basis) and the second part was used
for evaluation of forecasting accuracy. We have compared all three models in terms of total log-likelihood
on the testing part of the sample as this is a natural fit criterion for GARCH models. Results are given in
Table 4. In 26 out of 51 cases the model 3 (GARCH on standardized residuals) provided the best forecasts
and in 17 out of the rest 25 cases our model outperformed regular GARCH. Overall, the results support the
hypothesis that there is a significant “volatility clustering” in the data, however our model is generally better
in forecasting volatility than the results based on pure historical data. Moreover, our model seems to capture
effects of time and price on claim volatility that are orthogonal to the heteroscedasticity captured by GARCH.
The orthogonal nature of these two different sources of heteroscedasticity implies that one can significantly
27 Standardized residual is the return rt normalized by our prediction of the return volatility which is htpt where ht is given by
Equation 8
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improve forecasts of future contract volatility by running GARCH on standardized residuals from our model
rather than running it directly on the return data.
5. Discussion and Future Work
Overall, our experiments show that realized volatility of prediction markets is consistent with what our
diffusion-based theory would predict. The model provides good predictions of market volatility without
requiring one to know anything about the market except for the current price and time to expiration. However,
there are still areas for improving the model and providing even better fit. We outline three directions for
improvement in future work:
1. Our model ignores market micro-structure as well as possible behavioral biases such as “favorite-
longshot” and rounding biases. No market (especially prediction market) is ideally liquid - the bid-ask queue
has always finite depth and there are usually transaction costs. As well, traders are not fully rational. It is an
interesting research question to examine whether the volatility model can be extended to capture the effects
of the structure of the bid-ask queue and/or some standard behavioral biases.
2. Our idea of two underlying “ability” processes being driven by Brownian motions might not ideally
represent the real stochastic process driving the event probability. As we already mentioned before, most
of the contracts in our sample involve more than two competing entities while in the experimental part we
analyzed them as if they were binary cases. While the Appendix provides full derivation of the volatility
expression in case of more than two competing parties, the result depends on unobserved correlations between
Brownian motions driving the data and therefore cannot be directly applied to our data set.28 Even if using
the binary scenario is fine, we put significant restrictions on the claim price dynamics by assuming that they
are driven by Brownian motions. Brownian motions result in sample paths that are continuous and short-term
price changes that are almost normally distributed. However in our sample we frequently observe price
jumps that are completely improbable if we assume normal distribution of returns. For example, the contract
for Michigan to hold new democratic primaries in 2008 had a 59 cents price drop on March 19th, a move
that, according to our estimates, constitutes almost 15 (!) standard deviations. One might want to extend
28 Another interesting extension of this work would be to show how the correlations can be uncovered from the historical price data.
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Contract Model 1 logL Model 2 logL Model 3 logL
ALABAMA.DEM -431.09 92.341 59.567
ALASKA.DEM 4.8287 69.42 33.529
ARIZONA.DEM 67.601 114.71 140.06
MONTANA.DEM -152.22 122.64 -98.139
NEBRASKA.DEM -381.61 -29.548 1.445
ARKANSAS.DEM 65.974 138.61 156.86
NEVADA.DEM 180.46 240.81 256.33
CALIFORNIA.DEM -4850.1 -10412 -1047.2
NEWHAMPSHIRE.DEM 228.38 260.14 267.53
COLORADO.DEM 322.91 294.21 326.68
CONNECTICUT.DEM -198.42 425.92 289.61
DELAWARE.DEM 330.8 433.69 354.24
GEORGIA.DEM 127.85 121.84 130.57
NEWJERSEY.DEM 378.27 398.59 388.51
HAWAII.DEM 553.4 567.01 588.64
IDAHO.DEM 158.06 112.52 141.09
NEWMEXICO.DEM 310.15 302.49 319.12
NEWYORK.DEM 223.36 447.15 405.75
ILLINOIS.DEM 589.39 553.41 613.2
NTH.CAROLINA.DEM -206.83 155.25 42.05
NTH.DAKOTA.DEM 75.26 90.081 83.445
INDIANA.DEM 112.67 140.14 146.4
IOWA.DEM 329.78 329.35 329.39
OHIO.DEM 270.74 269.71 302.36
OKLAHOMA.DEM -8.6928 99.777 119.05
KANSAS.DEM 27.434 108.34 123.38
KENTUCKY.DEM 131.22 110.77 134.07
LOUISIANA.DEM 102.25 119.51 134.51
MAINE.DEM 366.05 330.65 336.14
MARYLAND.DEM 440.08 469.23 487.67
OREGON.DEM 358.88 356.9 348.78
MASSACHUSETTS.DEM 518.96 503.46 510.21
PENNSYLVANIA.DEM 324.09 325.93 335.2
MICHIGAN.DEM 271.28 300.39 292.54
MINNESOTA.DEM 324.2 323.13 324.94
RHODEISLAND.DEM 378.95 494.51 445.77
STH.CAROLINA.DEM 95.084 101.23 83.047
STH.DAKOTA.DEM 113.23 112.25 121.73
MISSISSIPPI.DEM 133.45 128.62 111.81
TENNESSEE.DEM -559.44 80.524 61.8
MISSOURI.DEM 182.58 202.71 207.44
DISTRICTOFCOLUMBIA.DEM Not converged 598.3 Not converged
TEXAS.DEM 141.63 117.9 144.61
UTAH.DEM Not converged 109.58 Not converged
VERMONT.DEM 431.11 429.22 452.49
VIRGINIA.DEM 240.58 242.67 262.89
WASHINGTON.DEM 436.91 424.04 434.15
WESTVIRGINIA.DEM -27.236 94.784 96.654
WISCONSIN.DEM 266.56 301.05 282.31
WYOMING.DEM -1285.7 82.772 -66.499
FLORIDA.DEM 226.92 209.12 225.51
Table 4 Model Comparison in terms of log-likelihood outside of training sample. Model 1: GARCH(1,1);
Model 2: our model; Model 3:- GARCH(1,1) on standardized residuals from Model 2
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our model to cover cases when the underlying “ability” processes are driven by a jump-diffusion i.e. have
a Poisson jump component in addition to a regular Brownian motion. Using jump-diffusion will allow for
modeling of more interesting dynamics such as sudden arrival of new significant information to the market.
3. Finally, in our work, we price claims as if traders are risk-neutral. Indeed there is no “pricing kernel” or
“stochastic discount factor” in our pricing formula. As prediction market bets are somewhat similar to binary
options, it is tempting to say that we just borrow a risk-neutral pricing approach from the option pricing
literature. Unfortunately, the traditional argument to support risk-neutral pricing of options, i.e. traders can
replicate the option by trading in the underlying stock(s) (Delta hedging) does not work for prediction
markets as the underlying either does not physically exist or cannot be traded. Nevertheless, we can suggest
at least three alternative arguments in defense of risk-neutral pricing:
(a) In some prediction markets traders may indeed behave as risk-neutral either because the market
uses “play money” instead of real ones (like Hollywood Stock Exchange which uses “Hollywood dollars”)
or because trader’s participation is limited (Iowa Prediction Markets limit traders’ positions by 500$).
(b) Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) show that under certain conditions prediction market prices maybe
close to the mean population beliefs even if the traders are not risk-neutral, so risk-neutral pricing might be a
valid approach even in the presence of certain risk-aversion.
(c) As we already described in the beginning of the paper, there is significant experimental evidence
that prediction market prices are unbiased estimates of the actual event probability.
Note that the last argument was our main justification in this paper. Without trying to answer the question
of “why is it so?”, we just adopted risk-neutral pricing to see where the theory leads us. The results we have
obtained in the experimental part of this paper, might be seen as a joint test of market efficiency and non-bias
assumptions, as well as our diffusion model.
6. Application: Pricing options on prediction market contracts
This section presents application of our model to pricing options on prediction market contracts. Options are
popular financial instruments with numerous applications such as risk hedging or speculation on volatility.
A classic “vanilla” call option on a security provides the right but not the obligation to buy a specified
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quantity of the security at a set strike price at a certain expiration date.29 A major breakthrough in option
pricing was achieved by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes who were first to discover the PDE.30 approach to
option pricing and obtain a closed form solution for “vanilla” call price now known as the Black-Scholes
formula (Black and Scholes 1973, Merton 1973).
In this section, we consider binary options on prediction market claims, like those recently introduced by
InTrade. Such binary option will pay $1 if on option’s expiration date (T ′) the underlying contract’s price is
larger than the strike price (K). Note that option’s expiration date (T ′) is different from the expiration date of
the underlying contract (T ).31 For example, InTrade’s option X.15OCT.OBAMA.>74.0 will pay 100 points
($1 in our normalization) if on T ′ = 15 OCT 2008, the price of the 2008.PRES.OBAMA contract is at least
74 points (K). The expiration date for the underlying contract is T = 09 NOV 2008.
As we already assume risk-neutrality, it is easy to define the option price:
ct = P{pi(T ′)>K|pi(t)}. (9)
We know the evolution process for the underlying contract:
dpi(t) = 0 dt+
√
σ21(t) +σ22(t)− 2ρ12σ1(t)σ2(t)√∫ T
t
(σ21(u) +σ22(u)− 2ρ12σ1(u)σ2(u))du
φ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)
dW,
so it only remains to calculate the expectation. The result is stated by the following theorem.
THEOREM 4. (Pricing options on prediction market claims in a simple prediction market with two
competing parties) In the setting of the Theorem 1, take T ′ ∈ (t, T ) and consider a binary option on the
contract pi(s) with payoff
ct = P{pi(T ′)>K|pi(t)}.
Define λ=
∫ T ′
t σ
2(u)du∫ T
t σ
2(u)du
i.e. λ is the volatility-weighted ratio of the time to the option expiration to the time to
29 In this section we consider European style options only. An American style option will give owner the right to exercise it on or
before the expiration date.
30 Partial Differential Equation
31 Naturally, it must be that T ′ <T .
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the contract expiration (in particular, if we assume that σi(t)≡ σi, then λ= T ′−tT−t ). Then the option price is
given by the equation
ct =N
(√
1
λ
N −1(pi(t))−
√
1
λ
− 1N −1(K)
)
. (10)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Several interesting observations can be made from this formula:
1. The option price is strictly increasing in the current contract price and strictly decreasing in the strike
price.
2. As time to the option expiration converges to time to the contract expiration (λ→ 1), the option price
converges to the current contract price (pi(t)).
3. If the current contract price is 0.5 and the option expires halfway to the contract expiration,32 then the
option price is equal to the strike price ct =K.
To give the reader better intuition of how the option price behaves with varying parameters λ and K we
include a plot of option prices for a fixed value of the current price (pi(t) = 0.5) in the Figure 6.
One can also take derivative of the option price with respect to the strike price to retrieve the risk-neutral
density of the claim price at time T ′. The result is
f(p) =
φ
(√
1
λ
N −1(pi(t))−
√
1
λ
− 1N −1(p)
)
φ (N −1(p))
√
1
λ
− 1. (11)
We have plotted it for different values of the current price and λ in the Figure 7.
7. Managerial Implications and Conclusions
Although volatility is one of the most widely studied concepts in financial markets, little attention, so far,
has been given to understanding volatility of betting or prediction markets. This is unfortunate as being
able to predict market volatility in prediction markets can be as important as in financial markets. Practical
applications may include detection of significant market moves, improving forecast standard errors in
32 as weighted by volatilities of the underlying “ability” processes
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Figure 6 Option prices for prediction market contracts as a function of the time to option expiration and the
strike price. The current contract price is 0.5.
prediction markets, pricing claims in conditional prediction markets and pricing options on prediction market
claims.
This paper is the first attempt to provide a theoretical model of prediction market volatility. In doing so,
we assume “ideal”, i.e., unbiased and efficient prediction market and assume that the event being predicted is
driven by a set of latent diffusion processes. Combination of both assumptions results in some interesting
theoretical results, such as the fact that instantaneous volatility of a claim on a binary event is a particular
function of the current claim price and its time to expiration. The result does not hold for events with more
than two competing parties as we show that claim prices for such events will also depend on correlations
between latent processes.
Volatility results we obtained bear certain similarity to the family of autoregressive conditional het-
eroscedasticity models started by the seminal paper of Engle (1982). The main difference is that ARCH
models represent conditional volatility of returns in a stock market as a function of previous absolute returns,
a well-known effect of volatility clustering, while our model suggests that conditional volatility in a prediction
market is a function of the current price and the time to expiration. The second difference is that while ARCH
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Figure 7 Risk-neutral densities for future contract prices. Rows correspond to pi(t) = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and
columns correspond to λ= 0.25, 0.5, 0.75.
models are usually experimental, our model of conditional heteroscedasticity can be derived theoretically
from a stochastic model of “ability” processes.
While our theory is based on a model of “ideal” market, our experimental results for a collection of real
InTrade prediction markets show that volatility patterns of real prediction markets are consistent with what
our model predicts, especially if we exclude marginal (very high or very low priced) observations from the
data set. Our results for a sample 51 of InTrade contracts on 2008 Presidential Elections demonstrate that
our model is better in forecasting volatility than GARCH applied to historical price data, although the best
performance is obtained by combining both models.
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Appendix A: Extending our Model to N parties
One of the limitations of the model we studied so far is that we consider only bets with at most two competing parties.
What if we have N > 2 parties (for example, Clinton, McCain and Obama) competing? Can the results be generalized
to the case when each of the parties have a separate “abilities” process? The answer is “partially, yes”. We start from a
ternary (N = 3) example and later extend it to the case of arbitrary number of assets; the technique we use is borrowed
from (Johnson 1987). To simplify notation we will also assume constant coeffients of the underlying diffusions, though
it is not essential for derivation.
In the ternary case we have 3 ability processes dS1 = µ1dt+σ1dW1dS2 = µ2dt+σ2dW2
dS3 = µ3dt+σ3dW3
,
where each Wi is a standard Brownian motion and corr(Wi,Wj) = ρij if i 6= j. Consider a bet that pays $1 at time T if
S1 ≥max(S2, S3). When does such event happen? Easy to show that this event will happen if and only if both of the
following are true:
1
σ12
√
T − t
(
W t,T1 −W t,T2
)
>
1
σ12
√
T − t (S2(t)−S1(t) + (µ2−µ1)(T − t)) ,
and
1
σ13
√
T − t
(
W t,T1 −W t,T3
)
>
1
σ13
√
T − t (S3(t)−S1(t) + (µ3−µ1)(T − t)) ,
where W T,ti =Wi(T )−Wi(t), σij =
√
σ2i +σ2j − 2ρijσiσj . It will be convenient to introduce extra variables Aij(t)≡
Sj(t)−Si(t) + (µj −µi)(T − t) to represent the right side of each expression. Note that because of the normalization
chosen, the left side of each expression is a standard normal variable; moreover, both variables are jointly normal. The
correlation between them is
ρ123 =
σ21 − ρ12σ1σ2− ρ13σ1σ3 + ρ23σ2σ3
σ12σ13
.
Define φ123 as the probability density function of these two variables:
φ123(x, y) =
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2123
exp
(
− 1
2(1− ρ2123)
(x2 + y2− 2ρ123xy)
)
.
The price of a bet on the win of first party is just:
pi1(t) =
∫ ∞
A12(t)
∫ ∞
A13(t)
φ123(x, y)dxdy.
We can apply Ito’s formula to the bet price. The result will have zero drift, however the quantity of interest to us is its
diffusion term which is{
− 1√
T − t
∫ ∞
A13(t)
φ123(A12(t), y)dy
}
dW12 +
{
− 1√
T − t
∫ ∞
A12(t)
φ123(x,A13(t))dx
}
dW13,
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where Wij = 1σij (σjWj −σiWi) is a standard Brownian motion. It can be further simplified if we note the following
fact about two-dimensional normal distribution. Let x, y be jointly normal with correlation ρ, zero means and unit
variances. Then we can write x= ρy+ z
√
1− ρ2 where z is independent from y and has zero mean. So,
P {x>A|y=B}= P
{
z >
A− ρB√
1− ρ2
}
=N
(
ρB−A√
1− ρ2
)
.
Now note that φ123(A12(t), y) = φ(A12(t))φ(y|A12(t)), where the last multiplier represents density of y conditional
on x=A12(t). Taking this into account, the diffusion term can be rewritten as
− 1√
T − tN
(
ρ123A12(t)−A13(t)√
1− ρ2123
)
φ(A12(t))dW12− 1√
T − tN
(
ρ123A13(t)−A12(t)√
1− ρ2123
)
φ(A13(t))dW13,
It immediately follows that instantaneous volatility of the first contract is
Σ11(t) =
1√
T − t

(
N
(
ρ123A12(t)−A13(t)√
1− ρ2123
))2
φ(A12(t))2 +
(
N
(
ρ123A13(t)−A12(t)√
1− ρ2123
))2
φ(A13(t))2+
2ρ123N
(
ρ123A12(t)−A13(t)√
1− ρ2123
)
N
(
ρ123A13(t)−A12(t)√
1− ρ2123
)
φ(A12(t))φ(A13(t))
} 1
2
.
Moreover, we can easily apply this technique to calculate covariances Σij(t) between any two claims pii and pij . This
result, however, is not very satisfactory as variables A12(t) and A23(t) depend on unobserved (to researchers) state of
the latent ability processes. We now show that the volatility is uniquely determined if we take into account prices of all
three contigent claim (pi1, pi2 and pi3)33.
THEOREM 5. (Prices define volatility for ternary claims)
Fix all ρ and σ parameters and define φijk as above. For each vector of prices (pi1, pi2, pi3) such that pii > 0, pii <
1,
∑
pii = 1, there exists a unique solution of the following system of equations:
pi1 =
∫ ∞
A12
∫ ∞
A13
φ123(x, y)dxdy,
pi2 =
∫ ∞
A23
∫ ∞
A21
φ231(x, y)dxdy,
pi3 =
∫ ∞
A31
∫ ∞
A32
φ312(x, y)dxdy,
σ12A12 +σ23A23 +σ31A31 = 0. (12)
Aij =−Aji ∀i, j ∈ {1,2,3}, i 6= j.
Proof:
Uniqueness: Assume that there are two different solutions (A12,A23,A31) and (Aˆ12, Aˆ23, Aˆ31). Without loss of
generality we assume that Aˆ12 >A12. From the equation pi1 =
∫∞
A12
∫∞
A13
φ123(x, y)dxdy it must be that Aˆ13 <A13
and so Aˆ31 > A31 (here, and in many other places, we use the fact that Aij = −Aji). From the equation pi2 =∫∞
A23
∫∞
A21
φ231(x, y)dxdy we conclude that Aˆ23 > A23. By summing all three inequalities with proper multipliers
we get σ12Aˆ12 + σ31Aˆ31 + σ23Aˆ23 > σ12A12 + σ31A31 + σ23A23. But that can’t be as both sides are equal to zero
according to Equation 12. We obtained a contradiction so there can be at most one solution of this system of equations.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm to restore A-values from prices
M12⇐N −1(1−pi1) {Define M12 by pi1 =
∫∞
M12
∫∞
−∞ φ123(x, y)dxdy= 1−N (M12).}
m12⇐N −1(pi2) {Define m12 by pi2 =
∫∞
−∞
∫∞
−m12 φ231(x, y)dxdy= 1−N (−m12) =N (m12).}
Ensure: m12 <M12 {Note, as pi2 < 1−pi1, we must have m12 <M12.}
a⇐m12, b⇐M12 {Prepare for binary search for A12 on interval (m12,M12).}
repeat
x⇐ 1
2
(a+ b)
A13 :
∫∞
x
∫∞
A13
φ123(x, y)dxdy = pi1 {As x < M12 we can find a unique A13 such that∫∞
x
∫∞
A13
φ123(x, y)dxdy= pi1.}
A23 :
∫∞
A23
∫∞
−x φ231(x, y)dxdy,= pi2 {As x > m12 we can find a unique A23 such that∫∞
A23
∫∞
−x φ231(x, y)dxdy,= pi2.}
r⇐ σ12x+σ23A23 +σ31A31
if r < 0 then
a⇐ x
else
b⇐ x
end if
until |r|< ε
Existence:
The proof of the uniqueness part suggests the Algorithm 1 to find the solution. Note that we don’t need to satisfy
the equation pi3 =
∫∞
A31
∫∞
A32
φ312(x, y)dxdy, because
∑
pii = 1 it will be satisfied automatically as soon as all other
equations are satisfied. The proposed algorithm proves existence of the solution as we can easily check that r(x) is a
continous and strictly increasing function of x (taking into account dependency of A13 and A23 on x) and m12 <M12
and limx→M12−0 r(x) = +∞ (note that for M12 we have A13 =−∞) and limx→m12+0 r(x) =−∞ (note that for m12
we have A23 =−∞). This completes the proof of the Theorem 2. Q.E.D.
Moreover, we obtained the following simple corollary:
COROLLARY 3. Conditional on prices pii, Aij values (and therefore Σ(t)
√
T − t) don’t depend on time until
33 Obviously, two of them are sufficient as all three will always sum to 1.
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expiration of the claim and drifts of the latent ability processes. Moreover, they will not change if we scale all volatilities
(σ1, σ2, σ3) by the same multiplier.
Example
Assume that current claim prices in the Presidential elections market for three Presidential candidates are pi1 = 0.2, pi2 =
0.3, pi3 = 0.5. Also assume that all three candidates are equally volatile (σi ≡ 1), there is a high positive correlation
between abilities of the first two candidates (ρ12 = 0.5)34 and low negative correlations with the third candidate
(ρ13 = ρ23 =−0.1).
Straightforward to calculate that σ12 = 1, σ13 = σ23 =
√
2.2 and ρ123 = ρ231 ≈ 0.337, ρ321 ≈ 0.772. By applying
our binary search algorithm we obtained the following A values: A12 ≈ 0.225, A13 ≈ 0.350, A23 ≈ 0.198. Finally,
the instantaneous volatilities are 0.2624√
T−t ,
0.3259√
T−t and
0.3904√
T−t . These volatility levels are close to what we would expect
if we considered each claim as a contract for an independent binary event. In the binary case, our estimates would
have been 0.28√
T−t ,
0.3477√
T−t and
0.3989√
T−t .
35 One may ask, whether ternary model always gives results “close” to the binary
case. The answer is “no” and here is one of the counterexamples: pi1 = 0.35, pi2 = 0.25, pi3 = 0.40, ρ12 = 0.5, ρ13 =
0.2, ρ23 = 0.35, σi ≡ 1. The ternary model predicts volatility of 0.08746√T−t for the second claim, while the binary model
overestimates it ( 0.3178√
T−t ).
The last example clearly shows that a multi-party nature of the claim can have influence on its volatility. Unfortunately,
the multi-party nature makes volatility much harder to calculate. Remember, in the binary scenario all we needed to
know in order to calculate the claim volatility was its current price and time to expiration: none of the parameters of the
underlying ability processes mattered if we knew the price. In the ternary case we need more data. At first, we need all
three claim prices pi1, pi2, pi3 (strictly speaking, at least two of them) to determine volatility of any claim. At second,
we need to know relative volatilities of each ability process (say λ2 = σ2σ1 and λ3 =
σ3
σ1
). At last, we need to know
correlations between Brownian motions driving each ability process (values ρij). This result may leave us wondering
whether the case of N > 3 is even harder and makes the volatility depend on some even more obscure parameters.
Fortunately, the answer is no - all we need to know are the current prices, volatilities and pairwise correlations between
Brownian motions. The result is stated by the following theorem.36
THEOREM 6. (Contigent claim pricing in a simple prediction market with N competing parties)
Consider a complete probability space (Ω,F , P ) on which we have a N-dimensional Brownian
motion (W1(t), ...WN(t); Ft); 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where Ft is a natural filtration for W1..N i.e. Ft =
σ ((W1(s), ...WN(s)); 0≤ s≤ t). Assume that each (Wi(t); Ft) is a standard Brownian motion and
corr(Wi(t), Wj(t)) = ρij , |ρij |< 1 (i 6= j). Consider an efficient and accurate prediction market for a competitive
event such that underlying ability processes Si areFt-measurable and satisfy diffusion equation
dSi = µi(t)(αSi +β)dt+σi(αSi +β)dWi,
34 For example, because they belong to the same party.
35 Note that they are not equal to ternary estimates assuming independence of the underlying Brownian motions (ρij = 0). In our
example, independence assumption gives the following volatilities: 0.2678√
T−t ,
0.3333√
T−t and
0.3780√
T−t .
36 In order to save paper we present constant volatility case. Readers are welcome to extend this result to time-varying volatilities.
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where µi(t) is a continuous function, σi ≥ 0, α≥ 0 and P {αSi +β > 0}= 1. Define a contigent claim price processes
pii(t) as
pii(t) =E [I (∀j 6= i Si(T )>Sj(T )) |Ft ] .
Under conditions above pii(t) is an Ito’s diffusion with zero drift and covariance matrix Γ given by the following
expression
Γij(t) =
1√
T − t
{∑
k 6=i
∑
l 6=j
ρikjlΦ
(
Ai −k;µik; Ωik
)
φ(Aik)Φ
(
Aj −l;µjl; Ωjl
)
φ(Ajl)
}
,
where
ρikjl =
σkσlρkl− ρijσiσj − ρklσkσl + ρjlσjσl
σikσjl
,
ρijk = ρijik,
σij =
√
σ2i +σ2j − 2ρijσiσj ,
Ai −j stands for Ai without element Ai j
Ai stands for Ai 1,Ai 2, ...Ai i−1,Ai i+1, ...Ai N ,
Φ (Ai −j ;µij ; Ωij) stands for cumulative distribution function of multivariate normal with mean µij and covariance
matrix Ωij ,
µij =AijΩij −j ,
Ωij = Ωi−j −j −Ωij −j
(
Ωij −j
)T
,
Ωij −j stands for matrix Ω
i where we removed j-th row and all columns except for j-th column (so the result is a single
column),
Ωi−j −j stands for matrix Ω
i where we removed j-th row and j-th column (so the result is a square matrix),
Ωi =
 1 ρi 1 2 ... ρi 1 i−1 ρi 1 i+1 ...ρi 2 1 1 ... ρi 2 i−1 ρi 2 i+1 ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
 ,
and values Aij are chosen to solve the following system of equations:
∀i : pii = Φ
(
Ai;0; Ωi
)
,
∀i, j i 6= j : Aij =−Aji,
∀i, j i 6= j 6= k, i 6= k : σijAij +σjkAjk +σkiAki = 0.
Briefly, dpii(t) = Σi(t)dW where W is some standard Brownian motion with respect to filtrationFt.
Proof: See Appendix.
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Appendix B: Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1
Define the function f(S) =
∫ S
x0
1
αx+β
dx, where x0 is some fixed value. Let Yi(t) = f(Si(t)) be a new stochastic process.
Note that f is strictly increasing on the domain of S, so we have that P {Y1(T )>Y2(T )}= P {S1(T )>S2(T )} i.e.
instead of original processes we can consider transformed ones. We can apply Ito’s formula to find drift and volatility of
the transformed process. First calculate the derivatives:
∂f
∂S
=
1
αS+β
,
∂2f
∂S2
=− α
(αS+β)2
.
Now Ito’s formula says:
df(Si, t) =
∂f
∂S
dSi +
1
2
∂2f
∂S2
(dSi)2.
Substituting everything gives us:
dYi =
(
µi(t)− α2 σ
2
i (t)
)
dt+σi(t)dWi.
Remember that P {Y1(T )>Y2(T )}= P {S1(T )>S2(T )}. Now,
Yi(T ) = Y1(t) +
∫ T
t
(
µi(u)− α2 σ
2
i (u)
)
du+
∫ T
t
σi(u)dWi(u)
So Y1(T )> Y2(T ) if and only if
∫ T
t
σ1(u)dW1(u)−
∫ T
t
σ2(u)dW2(u)> Y2(t)− Y1(t) +
∫ T
t
(
µ2(t)− α2σ22(t)
)
dt−∫ T
t
(
µ1(t)− α2σ21(t)
)
dt. We already know that the left side is a normal variable with mean zero and variance:
σ2t,T =
∫ T
t
(
σ21(u) +σ
2
2(u)− 2ρ12σ1(u)σ2(u)
)
du,
so
pi(t) =N
(
Y1(t)−Y2(t) +
∫ T
t
(µ1(u)−µ2(u))du− α2
∫ T
t
(σ21(u)−σ22(u))du
σt,T
)
.
As before we’re not so much interested in the formula itself as in the diffusion equation. By applying Ito’s formula
to pi(t) we can easily calculate its drift and volatility; we can save time, however, by noting that drift must be
zero as in the simple case (expectations of stochastic processes must have zero drift). The volatility term is just
∂pi
∂Y1
σ1(t)dW1 + ∂pi∂Y2σ2(t)dW2 which can be written as
σ(t)
σt,T
φ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)
dW
where
σ(t) =
√
σ21(t) +σ22(t)− 2ρ12σ1(t)σ2(t),
is instantaneous volatility (compare it with expression for σt,T ) and
W (t) =
σ1(t)W1(t)−σ2(t)W2(t)
σ(t)
is a standard Brownian motion. That proves the Theorem. To prove the Corollary just note that if σ(u)≡ c on [t, T ],
then σt,T = c
√
(T − t). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Theorem 2
We will use the notation from the Proof of Theorem 1, in particular, definitions of σ(t) and σt,T . Let V (t) = Σ(t)
σt,T
σ(t)
=
φ (N −1(pi(t))). This can be written as V (t) = U(pi(t)), where U(x) = φ (N −1(x)). Note that U ′(x) =−N −1(x)
and U ′′(x) =− 1
U(x)
. We are now ready to apply Ito’s formula in integral form which gives us:
V (s) = V (t)−
∫ s
t
N −1(pi(u))dpi(u)−
∫ s
t
1
2U(pi(u))
(dpi(u))2. (13)
Note, that
∫ s
t
N −1(pi(u))dpi(u) is an Ito integral and its integrand is square intergrable (follows from the construction
of the “ability” processes), so its expectation is zero. The second integral is∫ s
t
1
2U(pi(u))
(dpi(u))2 =
∫ s
t
1
2U(pi(u))
σ2(u)
σ2u,T
U2(pi(u))du=
∫ s
t
σ2(u)
2σ2u,T
V (u)du.
After applying conditional expectation to the Equation 13 we get
E [V (s) |Ft ] = V (t)− 12
∫ s
t
σ2(u)
σ2u,T
E [V (u) |Ft ]du,
here we used Fubini’s theorem to put the expectation operator under the integral. Now, if we define f(u) =E [V (u) |Ft ],
we have an integral equation
f(s) = f(t)− 1
2
∫ s
t
σ2(u)
σ2u,T
f(u)du.
After taking the derivative of both sides with respect to s and rearranging terms we get:
∂
∂s
(log f(s)) =
1
2
∂
∂s
(
log
(
σ2s,T
))
.
Here we use the fact that ∂
∂s
log
(
σ2s,T
)
= −σ2(s)
σ2
s,T
. Easy to see that all solutions of this equation are of the form
f(s) =Cσs,T . But then,
E [Σ(s) |Ft ] = σ(s)
σs,T
E [V (s) |Ft ] = σ(s)f(s)
σs,T
≡Cσ(s).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3
We will use the notation from the Proof of Theorem 1, in particular, definitions of σ(t) and σt,T . First, note that
E
[
(pi(r)−pi(t))2 |Ft
]
=E
[(∫ r
t
Σ(u)dW
)2
|Ft
]
=
∫ r
t
E
[
Σ(u)2 |Ft
]
du, (14)
where the last step is obtained by applying Ito’s isometry (Oksendal 2005). Now, the easiest proof is obtained by noting
that the evolution process of the prediction market contract
dpi(t) = 0 dt+
σ(t)
σt,T
φ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)
dW,
does not depend on parameters of the “ability” processes except for σ. As we will obtain the same result with any
valid values of µ,α and β, we can as well take the simplest possible set: µ ≡ 0, α ≡ 0, β ≡ 1. With these settings
Y (t) = Y1(t)− Y2(t) is just a Brownian motion and pi(u) =N
(
Y (u)
σu,T
)
and Σ(u) = σ(u)
σu,T
φ
(
Y (u)
σu,T
)
. By using the
normality of increments of a standard Brownian motion:
E
[
Σ(u)2 |Ft
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1
σt,u
φ
(
δ
σt,u
)[
σ(u)
σu,T
φ
(
Y (t) + δ
σu,T
)]2
dδ.
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Simple algebraic calculations give
φ
(
δ
σt,u
)
φ2
(
Y (t) + δ
σu,T
)
= φ
δ
√
2σ2t,u +σ2u,T
σt,uσu,T
+C
φ2
 Y (t)√
2σ2t,u +σ2u,T
 .
Only the first term depends on δ, so we can integrate to obtain
E
[
Σ(u)2 |Ft
]
=
σ2(u)φ2
(
Y (t)√
2σ2t,u+σ
2
u,T
)
σu,T
√
2σ2t,u +σ2u,T
=
σ2(u)
σu,T
√
2σ2t,u +σ2u,T
φ2
N −1 (pi(t))σt,T√
2σ2t,u +σ2u,T
 .
This can be rewritten as
E
[
Σ(u)2 |Ft
]
=
σ2(u)/σ2t,T√
1−λ(u)√1 +λ(u)φ2
(
N −1 (pi(t))√
1 +λ(u)
)
,
where
λ(u) =
σ2t,u
σ2t,T
.
Note that d(λ(u)) = σ(u)
2
σ2
t,T
. If we substitute this expression to the Equation 14 and change the variable as u 7−→ λ we
immediately obtain the Equation 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4
We will use the notation from the Proof of Theorem 1. The easiest proof is obtained by noting that the evolution process
of the prediction market contract
dpi(t) = 0 dt+
σ(t)
σt,T
φ
(
N −1 (pi(t))
)
dW,
does not depend on parameters of the “ability” processes. As we will obtain the same result with any valid values of
µ,α and β, we can as well take the simplest possible set: µ≡ 0, α≡ 0, β ≡ 1. With these settings Y (t) = Y1(t)−Y2(t)
is just a Brownian motion and pi(t) =N
(
Y (t)
σt,T
)
, so
P{pi(T ′)>K|pi(t)}= P
{
N
(
Y (T ′)
σT ′,T
)
>K
∣∣∣∣N (Y (t)σt,T
)
= pi(t)
}
.
The resulting formula can be obtained by simple algebraic manipulations and the fact that Y (T ′)−Y (t) is a normal
random variable with mean zero and standard deviation σt,T ′ . Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof is a straightforward but tedious extension of the 3-dimensional argument to higher dimensions. We’ll sketch it
below.
At first, as in proof of the binary case, define the function f(S) =
∫ S
x0
1
αx+β
dx, where x0 is some fixed value. Let
Yi(t) = f(Si(t)) be a new stochastic process. Note that P {Yi(T )>maxj 6=iPj(T )}= P {Si(T )>maxj 6=i Sj(T )}.
After applying Ito’s formula we get
dYi =
(
µi(t)− α2 σ
2
i
)
dt+σidWi.
Remember that pii is the price of a bet that pays $1 at time T if Yi(T )≥maxj 6=i Yj(T ). This can happen if and only if
∀j 6= i the following is true:
1
σij
√
T − t
(
W t,Ti −W t,Tj
)
>
1
σij
√
T − t
(
Yj(t)−Yi(t) +
∫ T
t
(µj −µi)(u)du
)
≡−Aij(t). (15)
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From this representation we can see that
∀i, j i 6= j : Aij =−Aji,
∀i, j i 6= j 6= k, i 6= k : σijAij +σjkAjk +σkiAki = 0.
Moreover, the left side of the equation 15 is a standard normal variable. Moreover, all these variables are jointly normal
and their covariance matrix is Ωi. It immediately follows that pii = Φ (Ai;0; Ωi).
Ito’s formula again gives us drift of pii: ∑
j 6=i
∂Φ (Ai;0; Ωi)
∂Aij
1√
T − tdWij .
To complete the proof just note that
∂Φ(Ai;0;Ωi)
∂Aij
is the cumulative distribution function of Ai −j conditional on Aij
multiplied by the marginal density at Aij (i.e. φ(Aij)). But conditioning a multivariate normal variable on one of
its components also gives a normal variable and its mean and variance are given by µij and Ωij (Wikipedia 2008).
Q.E.D.
